光華講壇——社會(huì)名流與企業(yè)家論壇第6665期

主題：Does employee social media influence CEO risk-taking incentives? Evidence from Glassdoor coverage （員工社交媒體是否影響CEO風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)動(dòng)機(jī)？來(lái)自于Glassdoor覆蓋的證據(jù)）

主講人：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué) 楊格博士

主持人：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院 華晨

時(shí)間：11月19日10:30-12:00

會(huì)議地點(diǎn)：柳林校區(qū)誠(chéng)正樓650

主辦單位：會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院 科研處

主講人簡(jiǎn)介：

楊格博士，現(xiàn)為對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國(guó)際商學(xué)院財(cái)務(wù)管理學(xué)系助理教授。他畢業(yè)于新加坡國(guó)立大學(xué)，獲金融學(xué)博士學(xué)位。主要研究方向?yàn)橘Y本市場(chǎng)、公司財(cái)務(wù)、公司治理、金融不端行為。楊博士已經(jīng)在多個(gè)國(guó)內(nèi)外優(yōu)秀期刊上發(fā)表論文。

內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：

我們研究了公司董事會(huì)在應(yīng)對(duì)Glassdoor（一個(gè)收集和傳播員工滿(mǎn)意度評(píng)論的平臺(tái)）報(bào)道時(shí)，對(duì)CEO薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行的戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整。通過(guò)利用首次在Glassdoor上發(fā)布評(píng)論的分階段引入，我們采用了交疊雙重差分的實(shí)證設(shè)計(jì)，發(fā)現(xiàn)CEO的投資組合vega在首次Glassdoor評(píng)論后顯著增加。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)與在線(xiàn)員工評(píng)論促使CEO趨向風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的假設(shè)一致，促使董事會(huì)戰(zhàn)略性地增加CEO的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)激勵(lì)，以抵消這一影響。我們的分析顯示，在員工評(píng)級(jí)較高、對(duì)人力資本依賴(lài)較低、財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)優(yōu)異或董事會(huì)更加穩(wěn)定的公司中，投資組合vega的增長(zhǎng)受到抑制。相反，在行業(yè)內(nèi)評(píng)論數(shù)量較多、CEO任期較短或較年輕的公司中，這一效應(yīng)則更為明顯。我們的研究結(jié)果通過(guò)多種替代規(guī)格、指標(biāo)和方法確認(rèn)其穩(wěn)健性，以應(yīng)對(duì)潛在的內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題。總體而言，我們的結(jié)果提供了有力證據(jù)，表明董事會(huì)在制定高管薪酬方案時(shí)主動(dòng)考慮在線(xiàn)員工評(píng)論對(duì)CEO風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的影響，突顯了員工社交媒體與公司治理實(shí)踐之間的重要互動(dòng)。

We investigate the strategic adjustments made by corporate boards to CEO compensation structures in response to coverage by Glassdoor, a platform known for collecting and disseminating employee satisfaction reviews. Utilizing the staggered introduction of first-time reviews on Glassdoor, we employ a stacked difference-indifferences empirical design and find strong evidence that the CEO’s portfolio vega increases after the first Glassdoor review. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that online employee reviews pressure CEOs towards risk aversion, prompting boards to strategically increase CEOs’ risk-taking incentives to counteract this effect. Our analysis reveals that the observed increase in portfolio vega is attenuated in firms characterized by higher employee ratings, lower dependency on human capital, superior financial performance, or more entrenched boards. Conversely, the effect is amplified in firms with a higher number of industry peers reviewed on Glassdoor, less tenured CEOs, or younger CEOs. The robustness of our findings is confirmed through a broad array of alternative specifications, measures, and methodologies aimed at addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, our results offer compelling evidence that boards proactively consider the influence of online employee reviews on CEOs’ risk preferences when crafting executive compensation packages, underscoring the critical interplay between employee social media and corporate governance practices.